OBJECT to any strike that could be viewed as based on race, gender, religion, or national origin.

"This motion is made under *Batson v. Kentucky*, the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 19, 23 and 26 of the N.C. Constitution, and my client's rights to due process and a fair trial."

REMEMBER:

- You <u>can</u> object to the first strike. The Constitution bars "striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose." *Snyder v. Louisiana*, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).
- Your client does <u>not</u> have to be a member of the same cognizable class as the juror. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
- You do <u>not</u> need to exhaust your peremptory challenges to preserve a *Batson* challenge.
- Batson applies to strikes based on race, gender,
 religion, and national origin. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
 T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); N.C. Const. Art. 1; Sec. 26.
- Peremptory challenges exercised by the Defendant are <u>not</u> relevant to the question of whether the State <u>discriminated</u>. State v. Hobbs, 374 N.C. 345, 357 (2020).

TIPS:

- Consider asking for strikes and objections to be made outside the presence of the jury.
- Whenever possible, make your objection immediately, before jurors are excused, so that they can be seated if your objection is granted.

SLOW DOWN

- 1. A strong *Batson* objection is well-supported. Take the time you need to gather and argue your facts.
- 2. Check your own implicit biases
 - Am I hesitant to object because of my own implicit biases or fear of talking about race?
 - Avoid "Reverse Batson" Select jurors based on their answers, not stereotypes
 - What assumptions am I making about this juror?
 - How would I interpret that answer if it were given by a juror of another race?

STEP ONE: PRIMA FACIE CASE

You have burden to show an inference of discrimination

Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005).

Step one is "not intended to be a high hurdle for defendants to cross." *Hobbs*, 374 N.C. at 350 (2020).

"The burden on a defendant at this stage is one of production, not persuasion...At the stage of presenting a prima facie case, the defendant is not required to persuade the court conclusively that discrimination has occurred." Hobbs, 374 N.C. at 351.

Establishing a *Batson* violation does not require direct evidence of discrimination. *Batson v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) ("Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may include proof of disproportionate impact.")

"All circumstances" are relevant, including history. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478; Hobbs, 374 NC at 350-51.

• Calculate and give the <u>strike pattern/disparity</u>. *Miller-El v. Dretke*, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41 (2005).

"The State has stuck ____% of Black jurors and ____% of white jurors" or

"The State has used 3 of its 4 peremptory strikes on Black jurors"

- Give the <u>history</u> of strike disparities and *Batson* violations by this DA's office/prosecutor. *Miller-El*, 545 U.S. at 254, 264; *Flowers v. Mississippi*, 139 S.Ct. 2245 (2019) (Contact CDPL for supporting data from your county.)
- State <u>questioned juror differently</u> or very little. *Miller-El*, 545 U.S. at 241, 246, 255; *State v. Clegg*, 380 N.C. 127 (2022); *Hobbs*, 374 N.C. at 358-59.
- Juror is <u>similar to white jurors passed</u> (describe how). Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 505-506 (2016); Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-85.
- State the <u>racial factors</u> in case (race of Defendant, victim, any specific facts of crime).
- No apparent reason for strike.

STEP TWO: RACE-NEUTRAL EXPLANATION

Burden shifts to State to explain strike

Hobbs, 374 N.C. at 354.

- If the State volunteers reasons without prompting from the Court, the prima facie showing is assumed; move to step 3. Hobbs, 374 N.C. at 354; Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
- Prosecutor must give a reason and the reason offered must be the actual reason. Clegg, 380 N.C. at 149; State v. Wright, 189 N.C. App. 346 (2008).
- Court cannot suggest its own reason for the strike. *Miller-El*, 545 U.S. at 252; *Clegg*, 380 N.C. at 144.
- Argue reason is not race-neutral (e.g., NAACP membership)



You now have burden to prove it's more likely than not race was a significant factor

Judge must weigh all your evidence, including what you presented at Step One. *Clegg*, 380 N.C. at 156.

You do <u>not</u> need smoking gun evidence of discrimination. *Clegg*, 380 N.C. at 157-57.

Peremptory challenges exercised by the Defendant are not relevant. *Hobbs*, 380 N.C. at 357.

Absolute certainty is <u>not</u> required. Standard is more likely than not, i.e. whether the <u>risk</u> of discrimination is unacceptable. *Clegg*, 380 N.C at 162-63.

Race does not have to be the only factor. It need only be "significant" in determining who was challenged and who was not. *Miller-El*, 545 U.S. at 252.

The defendant does not bear the burden of disproving every reason proffered by the State. *Foster*, 578 U.S. at 512.

The best way to prove purposeful discrimination is to show the prosecutor's Step Two reasons are <u>pretextual</u>

- Reason <u>applies equally to white</u> <u>jurors</u> the State has passed.
 Compared jurors don't have to be identical. *Miller-El*, 545 U.S. at 247, n.6; *Hobbs*, 374 N.C. at 358-59.
- Reason is <u>not supported by the</u>
 <u>record.</u> Foster, 578 U.S. at 502-503;
 Clegg, 380 N.C. at 154 (pretext shown when a prosecutor misstates, mischaracterizes, or simply misremembers).
- Reason is <u>nonsensical or</u> fantastic. Foster, 578 U.S. at 509.
- Reason is <u>race-related</u>. E.g., juror supports Black Lives Matter
- State <u>failed to ask the juror any</u> <u>questions about the topic</u> the
 State now claims is disqualifying. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241.
- State <u>questioned Black and white</u> <u>jurors differently</u>. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 255.

- Reasons courts have found inherently suspect
- Juror's demeanor or body language. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479, 488; Clegg, 380 N.C. at 155 (should be viewed with "significant suspicion.")
- Juror's expression of hardship or reluctance
 to serve. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 482 (hardship and reluctance does not bias the juror against any one side; only causes them to prefer quick resolution, which might in fact favor the State).
- A laundry list of reasons. Foster, 578 U.S. at 502.

• State gave <u>shifting reasons</u>. Foster, 578 U.S. at 507; Clegg, 380 N.C. at 154.

REMEDY FOR BATSON VIOLATION

If the court sustains your *Batson* objection, the improperly struck juror(s) should be seated, or the entire venire should be struck. *State v. McCollum*, 334 N.C. 208, 235 (1993).